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Abstract 
 
The present paper analyses the consumption behaviour of Albanian families. In particular the empirical work 
aims to cast some light upon the relationship between consumption in education and the volume of 
remittances, sent internally and from abroad by households members. 
The empirical question is whether remittances positively contribute to higher consumption in education and 
whether these transfers represent a distinct source of welfare from other components of total household 
income. Moreover, the available data set allows us to distinguish between internal and international 
remittances and this contributes to important insights into the understanding of the reasons to remit. In fact 
the different motivations behind remitting may influence the expenditure pattern out of transfers. The 
empirical estimation accounts for the censored nature of the education consumption through using Tobit, 
Heckman two-step as well as semiparametric models for sample selection are applied. A final econometric 
aspect that deserves concern is the possible endogeneity one of the regressors. To account for this problem, 
instrumental variable estimation is employed. 
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1. Introduction 
Albania, notwithstanding its effort to build the foundations for a market-based economy, 
which recently granted the nation macroeconomic stability, as well as the achievement of the best 
GDP performance in terms of rate of growth in the South Eastern Europe, remains one of the 
poorest countries in Europe. Per capita income is one of the lowest among the transition economies 
and the state of poverty is pervasive, with 25 percent of the population living in poverty (World 
Bank, 2003). Moreover, nearly five percent of the population lives in extreme poverty, defined as a 
situation where the basic food requirements are not met. 
High rates of unemployment and the severe poverty experienced by the households induced 
strong pressure toward migration. Albanians, among other transition countries’s populations, are the 
most inclined to leave their country. Statistics are poor, partly due to the irregular nature of much of 
migration, but most rough estimates of migration suggest that at least 15 percent of the population 
lives abroad and 40 percent of the people have some relatives settled outside the border of the 
country (UN, 2002).  
This large migration flows grant Albania an important source of capital in terms of both 
internal as well as external remittances: for example worker’s official transfers represent more than 
15 percent of national GDP and show a stable increase over time (World Bank, 2006). Nevertheless, 
despite the impressive size of the remittance flows, little is known about the effective use of these 
transfers from Albanian families. In particular, it is still under speculation whether this money is 
channelled through human and physical capital investment or is spent for consumer goods. 
Economists are often sceptical regarding the capacity of remittances to sustain economic 
development and they tend to be critical upon the use of remittances for mere consumption, with no 
funding left for saving and investment. It should be noted, however, that remittances alone cannot 
provide a solution for poor economic environment: if a sound economic climate is absent, it is 
unlike that remittances can be effectively used for other than consumption. 
While Albania’s economy is showing positive rates of growth, it still faces several critical 
constraints, which include among others, a poor governance across all sectors of the economy, an 
inefficient public sector, which obstacles improvements in the business environment and a poor 
public services quality. Another critical ground is represented by the schooling performance: 
Albania compared to most transition countries, is at the bottom in terms of educational attainment: 
the average school attainment is 8.5 years, which places the country far behind its neighbouring 
states. During the post-transition period, gross enrolment rates showed a decreasing trend: the 
enrolment rates in primary education declined from 103 percent to 99.6 percent, and in secondary 
education they dropped from 78.5 percent to 43.6 percent (World Bank, 2005).  
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The investigation of the link between remittances and education in Albania may provide an 
important inside upon the effectiveness of private transfers in stimulating a key sector, such as 
schooling. The ultimate objective of this study in fact, is to provide an empirical test upon the 
impact of remittances on education consumption at a household level. To meet this purpose, we 
employ an Engel curve framework, which is the most valuable way to analyse consumer behaviour. 
Moreover we move away from the classical theoretical framework, where different income sources 
are pooled together within the family. On the contrary assuming heterogeneity in interests and in 
bargaining powers among members within the households, we allow distinct income sources, 
including migrants’ transfers, to exert an independent effect on education spending. This 
methodology allows us to assess the actual propensity to consume education goods out of internal 
and external remittances separately.  
To our knowledge this is the first attempt which directly uses an education function to 
evaluate the link between remittances and schooling spending, as typically a full system of 
equations, which use budget shares in different items, is used. Empirical papers on education and its 
determinants exist, but only few investigate the potentials for remittances (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 
2003).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief review of the 
literature. Section III describes the data set used and provides a preliminary summary of the most 
relevant variables. Section IV outlines the methodology adopted. Section V presents the 
econometric results while Section VI provides summary and conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
 The economic literature offers extensive contributions in the estimation of Engel curves. An 
Engel curve describes how the consumer spending behaviour varies with income levels, holding 
prices fixed. In particular Engel stated that food expenditure increases with income and household 
size, whereas food budget shares decline with increasing wealth. Moreover items can be classified 
according to the size of the estimated income elasticity. Many studies attempt to identify the best 
functional form of the Engel curves, as far as the economic theory provides little guidance for the 
empirical specification (Hausman et al., 1995). In this regard, it has been explored the possibility to 
frame the Engel curves within a system of equations. A basic restriction in estimating the system as 
a whole, is the adding-up constraint, which is a direct consequence of the budget constraint. Other 
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desirable properties are the non-negativity of the component expenditure predicted by the model 
and the existence of an upper limit of expenditure for some components1.  
 Different class of models that partly or completely satisfy these criteria have been proposed: 
Bewley (1982) offers a good discussion on the economic properties of these alternative models. In 
particular the author compares the Addilog model (Bewley, 1982), which estimates the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of budget shares, with two linear specifications, known as the Stone’s linear 
expenditure system (Stone, 1954) and Theil’s Rotterdam Model (Theil, 1965), which utilize single 
item expenditures and the budget shares respectively, and finally the Working-Leser model 
(Working, 1943; Leser, 1963), where budget shares are linear in the logarithm of total expenditure. 
It should be noted that the Working-Leser specification (W-L) has been extended by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980a) to include the effect of prices within the so-called Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS).  
 Finally, attempts are made to incorporate demographic effects in demand function: in fact, it 
has been recognized that households with different characteristics show different expenditure 
patterns (Deaton and Muellebauer, 1980b). A sophisticated way to account for these effects is the 
use of household equivalence scales, which deflate the household expenditure according to the age 
and composition of the family structure (Engel, 1895)2. Such an approach has been as well 
motivated by the need to provide welfare comparison between household with different 
characteristics. An alternative methodology is the Rothbarth equivalence scale (Rothbarth 1943), 
which arises from the idea that adult welfare is directly related to the level of consumption on adult 
goods.   
In the empirical literature the estimation of Engel curves has been applied for a wider scope 
than simply quantifying total expenditure elasticities for different categories of commodities. 
Moreover, some authors report the interest in estimating the different marginal propensity to 
consume out of distinct income sources. For example Kooreman (2000) analyses the extent to 
which child benefits are spent for children goods, applying Dutch expenditure data. The author 
moves beyond the standard demand theory, which rules out the effect of the composition of income. 
In fact, given the fungibility of income sources, in the standard theoretical framework, different 
sources of income are pooled together within the households to model expenditure patterns. On the 
contrary, in the class of game-theoretic models of household behaviour, the composition of 
household income is relevant for expenditure pattern: in fact, parents may have different 
                                                 
1
 Theoretically plausible demand system can be derived according to two different approaches: either maximizing utility 
functions, that satisfy certain axioms of choice, or alternatively, imposing restrictions on arbitrary demand system. 
2
 Cited in Deaton and Muellebauer, 1980. 
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preferences as well as distinct control of child benefits, and this may result in distinct marginal 
propensity to consume. The author finds that the effect of child benefit statistically differ from the 
effect of other income source, notwithstanading this conclusion does not hold for large households 
and for adult goods. In a similar framework, Blow et al. (2004) for UK, report opposite results, in 
the sense that child benefits are disproportionately allocated in adult goods such as alcohol. The 
validity of pooling income sources to explain consumption pattern is also assessed in Case and 
Deaton (1998), who explore whether pension transfers in South Africa have different effects on 
behaviour than other kind of income. This may occur because pension income is more stable than 
other income or because pension income does not accrue to people who are typically responsible for 
consumption decision within the household. It should be noted that the literature on household 
decision making developed two classes of models, the so called unitary versus the collective 
models, which differ in the way decisions are taken within the family. According to the former, the 
household can be treated as a single entity and all members are assumed to possess unique 
preferences. Conversely, in the latter model, interests may differ among members as well as the 
bargaining power. Case and Deaton find that there is not relevant distinction in spending out of 
pension compared to other income and they conclude that pension receivers are likely to be the 
main decision makers. This conclusion is corroborated by noting that in the majority of pension 
households, the pensioner is identified with the head or with the head’s spouse. Maitra and Ray 
(2003) apply the same data set from South Africa, but they develop a complete system framework, 
to account for possible sequentiality between pension income, private transfers and other resource 
flows. In fact, the amount of pension transfers depend upon the magnitude of labour income, and 
conditional on these two sources, the household determines the resources to allocate in migration, 
which in turn affect the amount of remittances. Finally, the family determines the expenditure 
pattern. Their finding is in contrast to Case and Deaton as they report that the Rands from transfers 
are not spent as the Rands from non-transfers. For example remittances have a positive and 
significant impact on budget share of education whereas income does not influence it. Moreover, 
pension and migrant households show different expenditure pattern compared to households which 
do not receive such transfers. In Alderman (1996) domestic remittances, international remittances, 
pensions and other source of (transitory) income are used to analyse expenditure and savings in 
Pakistan. It results that pension and international remittances go entirely to savings, whereas a 
relevant amount of consumption comes from internal private transfers: this grants domestic 
remittances a flavour of permanent income. In addition this finding shows the distinct propensity to 
consume and save out of different income sources.   
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The way remittances are spent by migrant households is significantly researched and a 
specific interest goes to analyse the comparison between consumption behaviour of migrant and 
non-migrant households. For example, in Zarate-Hoyos (2004) for Mexico, the author distinguishes 
between current consumption, consumer goods and investment goods. A smaller proportion of 
spending in the various categories for migrants than for non-migrants households is documented; 
the author concludes that movers tend to save more than the rest of the population. Taylor and Mora 
(2006) for Mexico report quite dissimilar consumption patterns not only among migrants and non-
migrants families, but also among households with internal and international movers. In fact, 
households with international migrants tend to spend relevant shares of expenditure in durable and 
investment goods; conversely, households with internal movers display the highest share of 
resources for food. Adams (2005), comparing the expenditure behaviour of migrant and non-
migrant households in Guatemala, lists three main results: first, the share of income spent in food 
consumption, at the margin, is lower for households receiving remittances than for non-remittance-
receiving families and this is true for both internal and international flows. Second, migrant families 
have a much higher marginal budget share allocated in housing than non-migrants and finally, the 
same is true for expenditure in education. In particular, disaggregating for level of education, it 
appears that households receiving remittances spent much more on secondary education than do 
non migrant families. Applying a different methodology, Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) document 
for El Salvador a positive effect of remittances on investment in human capital. The authors 
estimate the determinants of the hazard of dropping school and they find that remittances reduce the 
hazard rate. Moreover, the effect of the transfers statistically differs from the effect of other income 
sources. This distinct effect of remittances may depend upon the stable nature of the transfer or 
upon some types of conditionality made by the movers, who send remittances for the specific 
purpose of educating the younger family members.  
 Education can be interpreted according to an intertemporal arrangement between movers 
and the family: migrants receive education in order to move and gain urban wages; remittances 
consequently represent the repayment for this investment and they are used by the family members 
to finance subsequent education of younger siblings (see Lucas, 1997). Although the empirical 
literature that explicitly analyses demand functions for education is fairly vast, the paper from Cox-
Edwards and Ureta is the only test upon the potential effects of migration on education. The 
significant impact of remittances accounted by the authors gives support to the intertemporal 
arrangement view.  
More general analysis on the determinants of education includes, among others, Glick and 
Sahn (2000): the authors, applying an ordered probit model for West African countries, highlight 
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the importance of parental education, household income and composition in influencing the number 
of years of schooling of boys and girls separately. In this regard, while mother’s education is 
significantly correlated with girls’ schooling but not with boys’ schooling, fathers’ education 
influences both genders’ attainments. Dostie and Jayaraman (2006) for India confirm both the 
relevance of parental education on the probability of children’s enrolment as well as the critical 
effect of maternal education, though restricted to girls’ enrolment decision. Moreover, they 
emphasize the importance of village level factors, which may encourage schooling through a simple 
price effect or through increasing the expected returns to schooling.  
3. Description of the Data 
The data employed for this study are extracted from the Albanian Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (ALSMS) conducted between April and September 2002. The survey was 
undertaken by the national Institute of Statistics and the World Bank jointly and represents the first 
round of a five year project designed to undertake poverty assessment. The ALSMS questionnaire 
contains general information at household and individual level, as well as information on household 
expenditure on several aggregate components. Moreover data on private transfers received from 
abroad and from internal Albania are collected.  
The number of observations for the analysis, represented by households whose heads has a 
working age, is 2927 notwithstanding the data set originally contained information for 3599 
families. However, the exclusion of households whose head does not meet the age limits and the 
exclusions of units with missing observations in the relevant variables leave us with 2927 
households. 
Relevant to this analysis is the education variable, which represents the monthly total 
household payments related to pre-school and higher education. Only 62 percent of total 
households, however, report positive spending on this item: there is in fact a substantial censoring 
in the variable, which requires a specific econometric treatment. Table 1 reports the average 
expenditure in education for different consumption quintiles. Not surprisingly, the expenditure in 
education increases with wealth: in fact, at higher quintiles of consumption per capita, the spending 
in education rises. This last finding emphasizes the critical role of household budget constraint in 
explaining education demand functions. In this regard, it is often argued that consumption rather 
than income better proxies household life-time resources: in fact household income changes over 
time and the income received in a particular year may be a crude measure of the household’s living 
standards. Therefore, in this analysis, total consumption is used in lieu of permanent income.  
The consumption aggregate has been computed by the World Bank as the main welfare 
indicator for poverty assessment in Albania. The aggregate variable includes food consumption, 
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non-food expenses, utilities, education, health, and durables expenses. It should be noted that 
housing purchases are not included, as the definition of the expenses on this item proved quite 
controversial3. Moreover, for durable goods, the monetary benefit associated with the use of the 
goods, rather than the actual expenses for purchases are considered.  
Table 1: Education consumption according to income distribution 
Quintile of household 
income per capita 
Mean expenditure per 
capita in education 
1 104.8 
2 128.6 
3 207.9 
4 267.3 
5 388.5 
Total 1000 
  
The data set provide us with detailed information on the amount of transfers received in the form of 
goods or in-cash from family members; moreover the value of remittances sent by internal movers 
can be distinguished from the amount sent by international movers. Table 2 reports the incidence of 
households receiving remittances according to various income quintiles as well as the mean values 
of the transfers. The interesting feature is that the percentage of recipient families decreases at 
higher income quintiles, suggesting that migration in Albania is a phenomenon which mainly 
involves poor households. In the bottom quintile resides the greater proportion of both internal and 
international recipient households, which a percentage of 7.5 and 20.3 respectively. On the contrary, 
among the richer families, only 3.8 and 15.2 percent receives remittances4.  
Second, transfers from abroad reach a much wider fraction of households than internal 
remittances do and this figure strengthens the statistics reporting high rates of migration to foreign 
countries. For example rough estimates suggest that at least 15 percent of the Albanian population 
lives abroad and 40 percent of the people have some relatives settled outside the border of the 
country (UN, 2002). In terms of size, external transfers sensibly surpasses the value of national 
remittances, indicating presumably a better working regime for international movers: on average, 
international remittances are ten times as large as internal transfers. There is not a clear link 
between the amount of the transfers and the welfare position of the households, though richer 
families seem to receive larger external transfers than poorer ones.   
                                                 
3
 The benefit associated with the use of a certain dwelling can be imputed from the value of the rent of the dwelling. 
However the absence of an actual rental market in Albania made not possible the identification of this value.    
4
 The specific welfare characteristic of the families receiving remittances can suggest that movers remit for altruistic 
motives. In fact, even if migration potentially involves all households independently to the welfare position, movers 
remit only if the family is located in the bottom of the income distribution. 
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Table 2: Households receiving transfers from abroad and from Albania 
Household receiving transfers from 
Albania 
Households receiving transfers from 
abroad 
Quintile of 
household income  
% of households 
receiving transfers 
Mean transfer % of households 
receiving transfers 
% 
Mean Transfer 
1 7.5 3997.8 20.3 24076.2 
2 5.8 2020.5 20.3 28014.5 
3 2.6 2555.6 18.5 27682.6 
4 4.8 4296.9 19.8 46354.3 
5 3.8 4009.4 15.2 42621.2 
Total 4.9 3375.9 18.8 33752.1 
 
In Table 3 average education expenditure is classified according to the households transfer regimes: 
families receiving no remittances, receiving transfers only from Albania, only from abroad or both. 
Non-recipient families consume considerably more than recipient ones in education goods, whereas 
among migrant families, internal transfer recipients spend much less. This first insight might 
suggest that both internal and international remittances are not treated as a permanent income by 
migrant families, and therefore the transfers received are saved rather than spent. Alternatively the 
result indicates that there might be a specific use attached to these transfers which does not involve 
education consumption. In fact migrants could have made conditions upon the type of spending: for 
example, for housing construction or land acquisition on behalf of migrants themselves.  
Table 3: Education consumption for different remittances recipients 
Household receiving: Mean education 
expenditure  
No Remittances 1055.4 
Internal remittances only 691.9 
External remittances only 837.7 
Both types of remittances 711.4 
4. Methodology 
The objective of this paper is to model an education function applying an Engel curve framework. 
In doing so, we allow distinct types of income to exert different impact on education spending: 
therefore, private transfers and household income enter separately the education function. Two 
alternative motivations are compatible with this structure: first, private transfers may embody a high 
variability, and therefore Albanian families may use them to increase savings rather than 
consumption. If this is the case, education consumption is a linear function of permanent income 
and transitory income separately, where the first is proxied by total consumption and the second by 
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private transfers5. This specification follows from utility functions that are additively separable over 
time and have either a quadratic or a constant-absolute risk aversion form (Paxson, 1992). 
 Alternatively, it may be allowed a form of heterogeneity in interests and in bargaining 
powers among different members within the households. This is the intuition of the so called 
“collective” models of household decision making, where the owner of the income may affect the 
pattern of consumption (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992; Browing et al, 1994). Therefore, 
allowing movers’ preferences to enter the aggregate household utility function, remittances can 
have a different allocation than other sources of income, due to the specific use attached by 
migrants to this form of transfers.  
It follows that the Engel function for education is specified as: 
),,,,( iiiiii ZITATNTCfe =           (1) 
where C is total household consumption proxing for permanent household welfare, NT represents 
transfers from Albania, AT transfers from abroad, IT institutional transfers and Z is a vector of 
family and regional features. In this regard, the inclusion of demographic characteristics capture the 
influences of spending habits and life-cycle effects. In fact, the differences in household size, age 
composition, educational level and other family characteristics are likely to affect expenditure 
patterns (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b). Although the use of budget shares has been common in 
the empirical literature, its advantage emerges within a full system of equations. This is however 
out of the scope of this papers, where a single demand function is estimated. Therefore, the total 
household expenditure on the specific commodity is used as dependent variable6. Table A1 provides 
a summary statistics of the variables employed. 
In modelling the determinants of education consumption, the censored nature of the 
dependent variable is accounted for: in fact, 38 percent of the households report zero purchases in 
this commodity. The application of OLS would result inappropriate. Assuming a simultaneity in the 
decision to consume education and in the quantity purchased, a censored Tobit model can be 
applied (Tobin, 1958). The limitation of this approach however, is that the impact of  the covariates 
on the probability of consumption and on the level of consumption is constrained to have the same 
sign. An alternative methodology, which proves more flexible, is the two-steps Heckman procedure 
(Heckman, 1979), which models sequentially the selection and the level equations. Therefore, the 
                                                 
5
 Three types of private transfers are distinguished in this paper: transfers from family members received from Albania; 
transfers from family members received from abroad; transfers received from institutions, such as NGOs or churches, or 
other non family members. 
6
 Among others, Kooreman (2000), Zarate-Hoyos (2004), Moffitt (1989), Case and Deaton (1998) and Hausman et al. 
(1995) use a similar specification. 
 11 
sign effects of the covariates are not constrained to be the same. There are two concerns however, 
when applying such model. First of all, the estimated parameters are sensible to the identification 
restrictions used: the model results identified only if there are variables that influence the 
probability of purchasing but not the level of education consumption. The second limitation is that 
the Heckman standard approach relies on strong parametric assumption on the error terms: in fact, it 
imposes the joint normality of the error term in the level equation and in the selection equation. This 
technique, however, is highly sensitive to the departure from the assumed parametric distribution: if 
the normality assumption fails, the estimates turn inconsistent. To overcome this limitation, semi-
parametric methods have been proposed: Newey (1999) suggests the combination of parametric and 
non-parametric functions, which are less sensitive to the violation of this assumption. In particular, 
a nonparametric approximation term, such as the power series, is used in place of the inverse of the 
Mills ratio in the second step estimation.  
There are two more aspects that deserve attention: the possible endogeneity of the variable  
total consumption and of private transfers. In regard to total consumption, the problem can arise for 
two distinct motivations. First it may occur that the unobservables that influence the education 
expenditure can be correlated with those that affect total consumption. For example, a negative 
shock experienced by the household can alter both total expenditure as well as the expenditure on 
education. If this is the case, the orthogonality between total expenditure and education purchase 
would fail. Second, an equally possible case is that households systematically make errors in 
reporting their expenditure, inflating, for example, the consumption on health and education and 
under-reporting the purchases on alcohol and tobacco. This leads to a measurement error that 
induces a non-zero correlation between the total expenditure variable and the disturbance in the 
education equation. It should be noted, that the econometric implication of both features is the 
same, as well as the testing and solution: the paper therefore, addresses this problem employing 
instrumental variable techniques to correct for potential endogeneity of total consumption. 
Regarding private transfers, a similar statement can be made: in fact, it can be argued that 
the decision to remit underlines an intertemporal arrangement between movers and the family. If 
remittances represent the repayment for a previous benefit received by migrants and they are used 
by the family to finance subsequent education of younger children (Lucas, 1997 ), the unobservable 
governing the decision to migrate and thus remit results correlated with the unobservable 
influencing the education consumption, inducing a problem of endogeneity similar to the one 
presented above. However, it is also true that the migration decision that generated the migrant 
remittances predates the educational expenditure decision: therefore, if we believe that the two 
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choices are not taken simultaneously, the assumption of exogeneity can be maintained. In fact, 
under this circumstance the unobservable that influences the remittance decision at time t-s should 
not be correlated with the unobservable governing the education consumption at time t. The 
endogeneity in remittances, however, can also be due to measurement error and this would require 
IV techniques. Despite this problem is acknowledged, the lack of appropriate instruments for 
remittances renders this methodology unfeasible here. 
5. Empirical analysis 
Equation 1 is initially estimated applying a censored tobit: the maximum likelihood estimates are 
reported in Table 4, along with the marginal effects. The total marginal effect is composed by two 
elements: first it includes the effect of the independent variables on the level of education 
consumed, weighted by the probability of purchasing education and second it comprises the effect 
on the probability of a positive spending in education weighted by the expected value of education 
consumption. For dummy variables the marginal effect is calculated assuming an impact change of 
the variable from zero to one.  
The covariates have the expected signs and overall exert a well defined effect on the 
education consumption. The positive and statistically significant effect of total consumption 
suggests that budget constraint plays an important role in a family’s schooling decision. The 
number of boys and girls in the schooling age has a positive and sizeable effect on education 
spending. Male headed households do not show a distinct consumption pattern compared to female 
headed families. The education of the household head is extremely important in shaping the 
purchases in schooling goods and the effect is more pronounced at higher level of the head’s 
education: this result is consistent with existing empirical findings, which highlights the critical role 
of parental education in children’s schooling attainments (Glick and Sahn, 2000; Dostie and 
Jayaraman, 2006). A surprising result is the non significant effect of the transfers’ coefficients: in 
fact, none of the transfer variables influences the education choices.  
The validity of the restrictions imposed by this model is measured computing the Fin and 
Schmidt test: the test evaluates whether a more flexible specification, such as a separate probit and a 
truncated tobit, has a better fit than the censored tobit. The result of the test is reported in Table 4. 
The computed chi-squared with 19 degrees of freedom is 3358: the null hypothesis is clearly 
rejected, discarding the use of the tobit model, in favour of a more flexible specification. Therefore, 
the two steps Heckman procedure is employed.  
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood estimates for education consumption    
 Tobit      Marginal Effect  
Household 0.052 0.02 
Consumption (0.004)*** 
 
Ageup5 -325.62 -149.18 
 
(108.29)*** 
 
Age6_18 1,058.81 485.07 
 
(64.24)*** 
 
Age19_65 189.92 87.01 
 
(70.90)*** 
 
Male 54.12 24.64 
 
(236.588) 
 
Age 398.87 182.74 
 
(65.985)*** 
 
Age Squared -4.511 -2.07 
 
(0.712)*** 
 
Primary 376.191 174.11 
 
(271.645) 
 
Secondary 1,083.84 548.9 
 
(307.452)*** 
 
Vocational 1,141.64 572.01 
 
(294.120)*** 
 
University 1,793.96 979.03 
 
(324.750)*** 
 
Central 795.34 382.78 
 
(214.711)*** 
 
Mountain 895.692 432.86 
 
(217.580)*** 
 
Coastal 655.198 313 
 
(213.272)*** 
 
Urban 929.991 420.69 
 
(149.360)*** 
 
Transfers from -0.003 -0.001 
Albania  (0.002) 
 
Transfers from -0.0002 -0.0001 
abroad (0.001) 
 
Transfers from 0.001 0.0003 
institutions (0.004) 
 
Constant -14,345 -6572.06 
 
(1,490)*** 
 
Observations 2927 
 
Log-likelihood -17503 
 
Fin and Schmidt Test 3358 
 
Notes: standard error in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The Fin 
and Schmidt test is computed as: LRT= [ ])(2 TPC LLL +−− = -2(-17503-(-14755-1069))=3358∼ )19(2χ  , where 
CL  is the log-likelihood for the restricted standard censored tobit, PL is the log-likelihood of the probit model and 
TL is the log-likelihood of the truncated model. It is distributed asymptotically as a 
2χ with k degrees of freedom, 
where k is the number of estimated coefficients in the censored tobit model. The marginal effect is computed as: 
X
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The set of identification instruments, applied in the first step probit equation of the Heckman 
procedure, consists in four variables. Three of them serve as a proxy for local conditions: in fact the 
variables source of water, inside phone and connected to electricity and gas may capture the quality 
of the community environment, in terms of providing access to utility facilities. Lack of access to 
these services may indicate a zone of low population which implies long distance to school: this is 
turn increases the cost of education and lowers the chance to attend it (Edwards et al. 2003). The 
fourth variable, which is the squared of the family composition variable, is more ad hoc, but it 
adequately performs the identification task.  
As already discussed, the assumption of the exogeneity of total household consumption may 
be problematic in this context. Therefore, the two-step Heckman procedure is first implemented 
through instrumenting the total family consumption variable. This allows us to test for the presence 
of an endogenous regressor. The exclusion restrictions is achieved through variables related to the 
dwelling conditions and durables, which capture the household permanent wealth as well as 
variables related to the household head’s employment and education, which represent possible 
determinants of expenditure. Within the first group are: type of household wall, presence of a 
bathroom in the house, quality of water, presence of an electricity meter and availability of a 
computer. In the second group are dummy variables indicating whether the head worked abroad and 
whether she has a second occupation8. Table A3 reports the result for the structural education 
equation, for the linear projection of the potentially endogenous variable and for the selection 
equation, along with the statistics of the  the test on the overall significance of the instruments, 
Sargan test and the Wu-Hausman test9. The instruments result highly correlated with the 
endogenous consumption variable, as  suggested by the high F statistics, and they prove to be 
orthogonal to the error process in the structural equation, as informed by the Sargan test: this gives 
support to the validity of the IV technique. Moreover, they enter with the expected signs into the 
consumption equation. 
Using the Wu-Hausman test, finally, exogeneity of the family consumption variable is not 
rejected10. This indicates that although the exogeneity of total consumption is generally 
questionable when modelling expenditure behaviour, in this context it can be stated that Albanian 
families are able to protect the education expenditures from the effects of adverse shocks, which on 
                                                 
8
 Similar instruments are applied in Kooremn (2000); Handa (1996); Case and Deaton (1996);  Maitra and Ray (2003) 
9
 Given that the education expenditure equation uses predictions for the household total expenditure, bootstrapping is 
used as it guarantees better properties than the use of the conventional variance-covariance matrix.   
10
 Although the data do not support the restrictions imposed by the Tobit model, the exogeneity of total consumption is 
tested within this model as well. The results are shown in Table A2: similar conclusion follows. 
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the contrary negatively impact on total consumption. The test may also suggests that the variable 
total consumption is not affected by measurement errors, although this final conclusion should be 
taken with caution.  
The consumption equation deserves some comments. Not surprisingly, larger households 
tend to show greater consumption, on average and ceteris paribus. Male headed households 
consume more than female headed ones and increasing level of education of the head enhances the 
spending capacity of the families. An interesting feature comes from the positive and statistically 
significant coefficients of two of the transfer variables: although the impact is extremely modest, 
internal remittances and money from institutions allow a greater family spending. The effect of 
transfers from institutions is twice as large as the effect from internal transfers, as ten leks increase 
in institutional transfers induce one lek increase in total consumption, on average and ceteris 
paribus. 
Given that the exogeneity of total consumption is upheld by the data, we proceed with 
modelling education consumption applying the standard two steps Heckman procedure. Table 5 
reports the estimated parameters. The variables employed as identifying instruments perform well 
their task as they influence the probability of consuming education without impacting on the level 
function.  
The striking feature in the results is the odd effect of the household size variables: in fact, 
while the number of young siblings and adults exert no effect on the education consumption, the 
number of kids below five years age has a counterintuitive impact, as they reduce the education 
spending. Different alternative specifications are tried but no one provide better results11. The 
number of young family members, on the contrary, significantly augments the probability of 
positive spending.  
Table 5: Two-steps Heckman procedure: education consumption 
 
OLS Probit 
Household 0.053 6.38e-06 
Consumption (0.004)*** (2.02e-06)*** 
Ageup5 -353.467 0.078 
 
(116.919)*** (0.051) 
Age6_18 142.074 1.897 
 
(96.086) (0.077)*** 
Age19_65 113.386 0.043 
 
(81.854) (0.033) 
Male -178.28 -0.002 
 
(262.996) (0.11) 
                                                 
11
 These include the use of the variable household size, the use of three variables relating to the number of males only in 
different age categories, the exclusion of the kid variable or alternatively of the adult variable.  
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Age 202.669 0.112 
 
(79.412)** (0.029)*** 
Age Squared -1.949 -0.001 
 
(0.861)** (0.000)*** 
Primary 528.57 0.226 
 
(302.862)* (0.126)* 
Secondary 1,051.32 0.427 
 
(339.136)*** (0.148)*** 
Vocational 1,090.21 0.389 
 
(325.611)*** (0.139)*** 
University 1,625.42 0.714 
 
(355.564)*** (0.160)*** 
Central 851.197 0.189 
 
(226.770)*** (0.108)* 
Mountain 1,346.64 -0.051 
 
(228.774)*** (0.115) 
Coastal 690.693 -0.062 
 
(156.916)*** (0.098) 
Urban 737.599 0.015 
 
(224.628)*** (0.107) 
Transfers from -0.004 3.64e-07    
Albania  (0.002) (1.22e-06) 
Transfers from 0.0002 -7.51e-08    
abroad (0.001) (2.79e-07) 
Transfers from -0.001 0.00001 
institutions (0.004) (0.00002) 
Source of water - 0.325 
 
 (0.094)*** 
Inside Phone - 0.148 
 
 (0.088)* 
Connected - 0.25 
 
 (0.085)*** 
Age: 6-18 squared 
- -0.261 
 
 (0.018)*** 
Constant -8,002.11 -4.596 
 
(1,861.378)*** (0.648)*** 
Lambda 614.4621    - 
 (279.5601)**  
Observations 2927 2927 
Adjusted R2 0.18 - 
Mc Fadden R2 - 0.494   
Test for Validity of 
instruments            1.62    P-value: 0.805 216.08   P-value: 0.0000 
Normality 20.45   P-value: 0.000  
Notes: standard error in parenthesis. Heckman two-step efficient estimates of the covariance matrix are applied. * 
denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In the level equation, the test for the validity of 
the instruments is performed adding the variables source of water, inside phone, connected and squared of age6-18 to 
the equation and then testing their overall significance. In the probit equation, it is performed in the same manner. The 
test is distributed as )4(2χ . The normaility test is distrubuted as a )2(2χ . 
 
The coefficient of household income is positive and significant, confirming the role played 
by budget constraints in spending behaviour. The variable is an important determinant of the 
probability of consuming education, even if the magnitude of the effect is very modest: in fact, a 
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one lek rise in household expenditure raises educational expenditures by 0.05 of a lek, on average 
and ceteris paribus. However, given that the educational expenditures is only three percent of total 
family consumption, the size of the parameter seems plausible. 
On the contrary, the income from remittances and institutional transfers do not exert any 
statistically effect on education spending. This finding has two implications: the first is that incomes 
from different sources are not pooled together within the household: in fact, the effect of 
remittances statistically differs from the effect of non-transfer income. Some family member may 
have distinct preferences and distinct bargaining power from other members, implying that the 
resource allocation is not determined by the household as a unique entity. For example, the 
ownership of the income may affect the pattern of its use: if the interests of the movers sending 
remittances and of those entitled to the institutional transfers differ from the interest of the head of 
the household, this distinction results in different estimated parameters. 
Conversely, the hypothesis originally stated that transfer may represent a transitory 
component, which induces an increase in savings rather than consumption is not supported by the 
data. In fact, notwithstanding their modest effect, in Table A3 it has been shown how they influence 
total household consumption. We are therefore left with the hypothesis that the household decision 
behaviour may be shaped by the so called non-unitary or collective model. 
The second issue is why transfers do not influence education spending. One explanation 
could be that expatriates have made conditions upon the type of spending out of remittances and 
this use does not include the education of siblings. Houses purchases or investment in land could be 
possible competing targets for the transfers send home by movers. This interpretation is consistent 
with the non-unitary models, as far as the interest of movers does not match the interests of the head 
of the household12. It should be noted that these variables neither impact the probability of spending  
in schooling items.  
Another explanation for this puzzling finding can be related to the schooling situation in 
Albania. In fact, the country displays the lowest educational attainments compared to most 
transition countries and experienced, during the post-transition period, a declining trend in both 
primary and secondary gross enrolment rates. This may indicate low rewards for education, which 
                                                 
12
 Given that total transfers comprise an in kind part, and given the in kind transfers are not easily fungible and therefore 
cannot be employed for any purpose, in one specification the in kind and in cash components entered separately: 
nevertheless, this attempt did not provide a better fit. The same conclusion followed when binary variables were used, 
in place of the continuous variable. One attempt for example includes four mutually exclusive dummies, capturing 
whether the family receives internal transfers only, external only, both internal and external or no remittances.  
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create little incentives for investment in education, as far as alternative investments may provide 
higher returns. 
Regarding the other covariates, the non-significant effect of the male coefficient suggests 
that maternal and paternal preferences for schooling do not differ: in fact female headed households 
do not place more attention than male ones to the education of siblings. The age coefficients 
confirm that life cycle profile of earnings, proxied by the age of the head, influences consumption 
spending and it does so in a non-linear way, as suggested by the significant effect of the squared of 
this variable. The schooling achievement of the head of the family is a very important determinant 
of the educational spending; moreover, the higher the parental attainment, the greater the 
expenditure in these items.  
The inverse of the Mills ratio enters significantly the education equation: the selection term 
can proxy for the unobservables and the positive estimated coefficient suggests that the 
unobservable influencing the probability of consuming education is positively correlated with the 
unobservable affecting the quantity consumed13.  
It should be noted that the two step procedure relies on the validity of the instruments, which 
should influence the probability equation but not the level equation. This requirement is well 
achieved in this context as suggested by the 2χ tests conducted in the two equations. Moreover, the 
estimated parameters of the instruments in the probit are statistically significant and have the 
expected signs, suggesting the better community conditions increase the chance of positive 
spending in schooling. Given the significant effect exerted by the inverse of the Mills ratio, the 
application of OLS to the truncated sample would return biased estimates.  
The standard Heckman procedure is based on strong distributional requirements and it is 
extremely sensitive to the departure from these assumptions: therefore, a normality test is computed 
to assess the validity of the procedure. Failure of the assumption implies inconsistent estimated 
parameters. An efficient score test, suggested by Chelser and Irish (1986) is computed and it 
strongly indicates a rejection of normality14. To overcome this problem, a two-step procedures that 
combines parametric and semiparametric estimation is performed: in particular, the selection term is 
computed as a power series approximation of the score index of the first step probit estimation15. 
Table 6 reports the estimated parameters. The adjusted R squared, the root mean squared error and 
                                                 
13
 The coefficient of the selection term is robust to the exclusion of one or more of the instruments.   
14
 It should be acknowledge that the test suffers from poor finite sample properties, as demonstrated by Orme (1990). 
15
 Buchinsky (1998) suggests alternative sets of power series. Among others, the power series of the inverse of the Mills 
ratio is considered. However, applying the approximation of the inverse of the Mills, the high-order selection terms 
exert an insignificant effect, probably consequently to the multicollinearity of the included terms. 
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the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) indicate that the polynomial of order two is the favourite 
specification.  
Table 6: Two-steps semi-parametric estimation: education consumption 
 Parametric Semi-parametric 
Household 0.053 0.053 0.051 0.052 0.052 
Consumption (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Ageup5 -353.467 -346.525 -353.335 -352.644 -352.87 
 
(97.569)*** (89.382)*** (95.122)*** (92.159)*** (89.833)*** 
Age6_18 142.074 133.047 78.451 87.414 86.949 
 
(92.744) (101.657) (100.991) (95.402) (113.616) 
Age19_65 113.386 115.672 116.062 116.953 116.096 
 
(82.273) (91.29) (83.905) (87.554) (90.298) 
Male -178.28 -194.527 -197.96 -222.669 -219.947 
 
(224.973) (203.913) (200.211) (203.112) (202.996) 
Age 202.669 192.176 195.129 193.642 194.356 
 
(70.397)*** (70.904)*** (70.805)*** (75.258)** (68.177)*** 
Age Squared -1.949 -1.827 -1.861 -1.848 -1.854 
 
(0.788)** (0.792)** (0.815)** (0.857)** (0.778)** 
Primary 528.57 539.732 510.938 516 519.795 
 
(199.712)*** (183.725)*** (199.910)** (169.488)*** (173.107)*** 
Secondary 1,051.32 1,066.78 1,005.06 1,014.73 1,021.53 
 
(271.259)*** (255.886)*** (262.417)*** (261.286)*** (240.485)*** 
Vocational 1,090.21 1,106.90 1,047.97 1,057.77 1,060.56 
 
(232.576)*** (234.927)*** (260.768)*** (227.218)*** (216.301)*** 
University 1,625.42 1,672.74 1,530.80 1,545.70 1,564.28 
 
(349.195)*** (341.792)*** (371.103)*** (352.325)*** (312.818)*** 
Central 851.197 860.581 820.095 825.074 826.746 
 
(232.483)*** (239.577)*** (236.934)*** (244.120)*** (205.731)*** 
Mountain 1,346.64 1,351.70 1,356.77 1,357.24 1,355.98 
 
(305.237)*** (318.449)*** (301.572)*** (305.716)*** (291.517)*** 
Coastal 690.693 699.756 653.654 659.603 660.205 
 
(160.355)*** (168.215)*** (149.198)*** (157.911)*** (137.249)*** 
Urban 737.599 735.006 728.475 727.632 728.98 
 
(207.002)*** (213.593)*** (204.189)*** (219.656)*** (194.408)*** 
Transfers from -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
Albania  (0.002) (0.002)* (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Transfers from 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
abroad (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Transfers from -0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 
institutions (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)* (0.009) (0.013) 
Lambda 614.462     
 
(297.618)** 
    
Z1  -211.943 -403.904 -385.308 -356.866 
  (156.803) (191.973)** (187.081)** (233.823) 
Z2  
 
139.007 91.774 132.312 
  
 
(70.538)** (98.1) (126.326) 
Z3 
 
  
12.291 -15.25 
  
  
(27.809) (87.12) 
Z4  
   
2.686 
 
 
   
(18.792) 
Constant -8,002.11 -7,349.05 -7,222.65 -7,165.04 -7,232.76 
 (1,764.456)*** (1,724.639)*** (1,641.038)*** (1,748.852)*** (1,626.082)*** 
Observations 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801 
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Adj R ^2  0.1786 0.1804 0.1802 0.1798 
RMSE  2770 2767 2768 2768 
AIC*n (Akaike):   33683 33680 33681 33683 
BIC (Bayesan):    -230.97 -228.5 -221.6 -214 
Wald (Z=0)  P-value  0.13 0.07 0.33 0.26 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors, performed on 200 replications, are reported. Column 1 reports the parametric two-step 
Heckman procedure. Column (3)-(6) show the semi-parametric estimation, where the selection term is approximated 
through power series of the standardized probit index. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
MSE is the Mean squared error of the leave-one-out prediction.  
 
It should be noted that the estimated coefficients are not sensitive to the way the selection 
term is treated: in fact, comparing column (2), which applies the standard parametric techniques and 
column (4), where the second order selection function is used, no important differences in the 
parameters appear, either in terms of coefficients size, or in terms of significance. Moreover, the 
hypothesis of no sample selection is as well rejected in the semiparametric specification, applying a 
Wald test. Therefore, the previous comments apply to this last estimation.  
6. Conclusion 
We model an education function applying an Engel curve framework. The ultimate objective 
of this work is to study the impact of internal and international remittances on education 
consumption. In doing so, we test the assumptions of the so called “collective” models of household 
decision making, which  allows a form of heterogeneity in interests and in bargaining powers 
among different members within the households. In fact, in our specification, incomes from 
different sources enter separately and are free to exert an independent effect on education 
consumption.  
To account for the censored nature of the variable education spending, a Tobit model as well 
as a two step procedure are used. Within this second framework, both a parametric and a 
semiparametric technique are employed, to overcome potential inconsistency following the strong 
assumption of the standard Heckman procedure.  
Some interesting results feature: first of all, the three methodology overall provide similar 
results, at least concerning the key variables. As expected, household wealth, proxied by total 
consumption, has a positive and well determined impact on education consumption, proving the 
critical role of family budget constraints in explaining purchasing behaviour. Moreover, a Wu-
Hausman test on this variable cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity of household consumption, 
and this emerges despite the property of exogeneity is generally questionable when modelling 
single item demand functions. This result may indicate that Albanian families are able to smooth 
education expenditures from the effect of adverse shocks.   
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A second important result is that transfers do not influence education spending. This finding 
seems striking but some interpretations can be provided. One can be that expatriates have made 
conditions upon the use of remittances and the selected allocation does not include the education of 
siblings. It may be the case, for example, that the interest of movers does not match with the interest 
of the head of the household and this distinction emerges in the differential effect of remittances 
compared to total household consumption. A second explanation follows from the distinct nature of 
the Albanian schooling situation. The low attainment rates which characterize the education system 
may be indicative of low rewards for education, which create little incentives for investment in 
schooling: therefore, the income accruing from remittances may be channelled into more productive  
investments, such as land.   
The previous result is consistent with the predictions of the non unitary models, as far as 
incomes from different sources exert distinct effects on consumption. In fact, the impact of transfers 
in the Engel curve statistically differs from the effect of non-transfer income.  
Finally, the selection term both in the standard parametric and in the semiparametric model 
exerts a significant effect in the education equation. The selection can proxy for unobservable 
factors and their statistical effect in the level equation suggest that it exists a form of correlation 
between the unobservables influencing the probability of consuming education and the 
unobservables affecting the quantity purchased. 
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Appendix 
Table 4: Sample statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Education 
Consumption1 
Monthly total household payments related to pre-school and higher 
education 1000.39 2524.73 
Total Household 
Consumption  
Monthly total expenditure of households, excluding rent 
consumption 
36674.52 18359.22 
Age: up to 5  Number of children of age up to 5 0.43 0.69 
Age: 6-18  Number of children of age included between 6 and 18 1.34 1.24 
Age: 19-65   Number of adults of age included between 19 and 65 2.74 1.13 
Male   =1 if household head is male; 0 otherwise 0.90 0.30 
Age of head  Age years of household head 46.10 10.39 
Age squared Age of head squared 2233.23 965.21 
Tirana =1 if the household resides in Tirana; 0 otherwise 0.16 0.37 
Central  =1 if the household resides in the Central area; 0 otherwise 0.28 0.45 
Mountain   =1 if the household resides in the Mountain area; 0 otherwise 0.29 0.45 
Coastal =1 if the household resides in the Central area; 0 otherwise 0.27 0.45 
Primary: < 4 grades Head’s highest educational level. =1 for no education or achieved 
four or less primary grades; 0 otherwise 0.09 
0.29 
Primary: < 8 grades =1 between five and eight primary grades; 0 otherwise 0.41 0.49 
Secondary  =1 for secondary level; 0 otherwise 0.16 0.37 
Vocational   =1 for vocational level; 0 otherwise 0.21 0.41 
University  =1 for educational level; 0 otherwise 0.13 0.33 
Urban =1 if the family resides in an urban settlement; 0 otherwise 0.55 0.50 
Transfers from 
Albania2 
Amount of transfers, in kind or in cash, received from family 
members migrated in Albania 
3375.88 26681.27 
Transfers from 
abroad3 
Amount of transfers, in kind or in cash, received from family 
members migrated abroad 
33752.12 119564.00 
Transfers from 
institution4 
Amount of transfers received from institutions 593.71 12843.25 
Identification variables for probit selection equation 
Source of water  Household type of water connection. =1 if running inside dwelling;  
0 otherwise 
0.59 0.49 
Inside Phone  =1 if household has a telephone line inside the dwelling 0.29 0.45 
Connected to 
electricity and gas 
=1 if household uses electricity and gas as source of heating; 0 
otherwise 
0.38 0.49 
Age: 6-18 squared Squared of variable age: 6-19 3.33 4.84 
Instruments for total household consumption  
Second occupation  =1 if household head has a second job; 0 otherwise 0.05 0.22 
Foreign job   =1 if household head performed the main job outside Albania; 0 
otherwise 
0.02 0.13 
Brick wall   =1 if the dwelling has a brick wall; 0 otherwise 0.85 0.36 
Dwelling Bath  =1 if the dwelling has a separate bathroom; 0 otherwise 0.62 0.48 
Quality of water  Quality of water in dwelling. =1 if water is good for drinking; =2 if it 
is not good for drinking but good for other uses; =3 if it is not good 
for any other use 
1.25 0.44 
Electricity meter    Type of dwelling electricity meter. =1 if dwelling has a shared 
electricity meter; =2 if it has its own meter; =3 if it has no meter 
2.25 0.49 
Computer =1 if household owns a computer; 0 otherwise 0.03 0.16 
Notes: 1 zero for1126 observations. 2 zero for 2,784 observations. 3 zero for 2,376 observations. 4 zero for 2,892 
observations  
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Table A2: Instrumental variable estimation for education consumption. IVTobit   
 IVTobit  
Household 0.061 
Consumption (0.013)*** 
Ageup5 -336.232 
 (110.873)*** 
Age6_18 1,041.02 
 (68.660)*** 
Age19_65 159.377 
 (84.058)* 
Male 14.179 
 (241.47) 
Age 397.597 
 (66.419)*** 
Age Squared -4.496 
 (0.716)*** 
Primary 396.23 
 (272.988) 
Secondary 1,049.65 
 (318.369)*** 
Vocational 1,103.39 
 (308.595)*** 
University 1,660.95 
 (396.850)*** 
Central 815.305 
 (217.044)*** 
Mountain 929.54 
 (222.604)*** 
Coastal 636.116 
 (216.134)*** 
Urban 930.584 
 (149.574)*** 
Transfers from -0.003 
Albania  (0.002) 
Transfers from 0.0003 
abroad (0.001) 
Transfers from 0.0001 
institutions (0.005) 
Constant -14,465.50 
 (1,497.714)*** 
Observations 2923 
Wald test of exogeneity                                  0.43            P-value=0.509 
F test on the relevance of instruments          35.82            P-value=0.000 
Test of  orthogonality                                    0.54             P-value: 0.80 
Notes: standard error in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The Wald 
test is distributed as )(12χ . The F test on the overall significance of the instruments in the first stage estimation for the 
endogenous variable is distributed as F(7, 2898). The test for the orthogonality is computed as a joint F-test (7,  2898) 
on a auxiliary Tobit regression which includes the instruments. 
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Table A3: Instrumental variable estimation for education consumption. Heckman two steps with endogenous 
regressor 
 
 Structural Equation Selection Equation Endogenous Equation 
 
Education 
consumption Probit Total Household consumption 
Household 0.058   
Consumption (0.016)***   
Ageup5 -355.772 0.100 1,761.05 
 (95.219)*** (0.051)* (705.674)** 
Age6_18 146.308 1.930 7,065.42 
 (87.263)* (0.078)*** (2,941.413)** 
Age19_65 94.655 0.057 3,412.76 
 (107.67) (0.032)* (487.111)*** 
Male -203.558 0.001 3,377.20 
 (236.468) (0.11) (1,548.738)** 
Age 203.696 0.114 137.361 
 (68.109)*** (0.029)*** (489.249) 
Age Squared -1.962 -0.001 -1.175 
 (0.780)** (0.000)*** (5.312) 
Primary 552.555 0.217 -1,462.76 
 (203.082)*** (0.126)* (1,816.19) 
Secondary 1,051.78 0.436 2,086.49 
 (255.767)*** (0.149)*** (2,073.52) 
Vocational 1,074.77 0.411 4,342.05 
 (242.147)*** (0.140)*** (1,990.684)** 
University 1,559.76 0.759 9,710.95 
 (474.778)*** (0.161)*** (2,260.437)*** 
Central 859.587 0.232 4,042.33 
 (237.831)*** (0.125)* (1,584.574)** 
Mountain 1,357.75 0.013 4,530.45 
 (311.091)*** (0.131) (1,632.588)*** 
Coastal 712.9 0.080 8,413.08 
 (232.624)*** (0.116) (1,430.490)*** 
Urban 694.526 -0.118 -5,991.01 
 (160.419)*** (0.098) (1,201.711)*** 
Transfers from -0.004 4.65e-07    0.047 
Albania  (0.003) (1.21e-06) (0.014)*** 
Transfers from -0.0003 -1.04e-07 0.005 
abroad (0.0005) (2.80e-07)   (0.003) 
Transfers from -0.001 8.90e-06   0.087 
institutions (0.005) 0.00002 (0.024)*** 
Source of water  0.284 3,178.84 
  (0.098)*** (1,208.975)*** 
Inside Phone  0.181 6,846.13 
  (0.087)** (1,080.328)*** 
Connected  0.251 3,419.98 
  (0.085)*** (1,075.173)*** 
Age: 6-18 squared 
 -0.264 -1,018.60 
  (0.019)*** (460.759)** 
Second occupation  -0.18 4,426.62 
  (0.155) (1,687.335)*** 
Foreign job   
 0.233 2,161.97 
  (0.274) (2,685.73) 
Brick wall    -0.012 2,820.94 
  (0.094) (1,113.897)** 
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Dwelling Bath  0.229 4,630.21 
  (0.081)*** (990.803)*** 
Quality of water  
 0.025 4,378.18 
  (0.088) (1,103.108)*** 
Electricity meter     0.089 2,543.40 
  (0.067) (813.606)*** 
Computer  0.232 19,965.86 
  (0.200) (2,527.521)*** 
Mills 637.558  4,061.62 
 (300.236)**  (3,281.67) 
Constant -8,177.62 -4.852 -13,987.67 
 (1,635.118)*** (0.694)*** (14,191.62) 
Observations 1799 2923 1799 
Sargan                             2.656                   P-value=0.98840 
F-test on the relevance of instruments       15.54                     P-value= 0.000 
Wu-Hausman F test:                           0.31306               P-value = 0.57588 
Notes: standard error in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Bootstrap 
standard errors, performed on 200 replications, are reported in the structural equation. The Sargan statistics is 
distributed as )10(2χ . The F test on the overall significance of the instruments in the endogenous variable estimation 
is distributed as F(7, 1769). The Wu-Hausman test is distributed as F(1, 1778). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
